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Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the
Administration of the Batson Rule
A.C. Johnstonet
Over a decade after Batson v Kentucky,' the constitutional
status of peremptory challenges exists in uneasy equilibrium. In
1986, Batson protected criminal defendants from a prosecutor's
race-based challenges to jurors of the defendant's race.2 Since
Batson, the Supreme Court has extended this constitutional pro-
hibition to a defendant's strikes3 and has removed the require-
ment that the defendant and the juror be of the same race.4 The
Court applied Batson to sex-based challenges in J.E.B. v Ala-
bama,5 citing historic discrimination against women in jury selec-
tion.' In the aftermath of J.E.B., some commentators have urged
the overhaul or even the abolition of peremptory challenges.7
But just five weeks after the Court extended Batson to sex, it
passed on an opportunity to extend Batson to religion by denying
certiorari in Davis v Minnesota.' The case involved a prosecutor
who struck a Jehovah's Witness, admitting that the prospective
juror's religion motivated the challenge.' The Minnesota Su-
preme Court ruled that Batson did not apply to the prosecutor's
challenge for three reasons. First, irrational religious bias does
t BA. 1995, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Chicago.
' 476 US 79 (1986).
2 Id at 89.
' Georgia v McCollum, 505 US 42,59 (1992).
Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 415 (1991).
511 US 127 (1994).
Id at 130-31.
See, for example, Deborah Ramirez, How Affirmative Jury Selection Enhances
Both the Deliberative Ideal and the Diversity of the Jury, 1998 U Chi Legal F 161 (arguing
for affirmative juror selection instead of peremptory challenges). See also Morris B.
Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U
Chi L Rev 809 (1997) (urging the elimination of peremptory challenges because juror com-
petence is an individual, not a group, matter).
' 511 US at 1115-16 (Ginsburg concurring) (justifying denial of certiorari by citing
the Minnesota Court's reasoning that religious affiliation is less self-evident than race or
sex, and that inquiry into a juror's religious beliefs is improper). But see also id at 1116
(Thomas, dissenting) (arguing that the extension of Batson to sex in J.E.B. also required a
similar extension to religion). See also Part III B.
State v Davis, 504 NW2d 767, 768 (Minn 1993).
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not pervade the jury system to the same extent as racial bias
does. 10 Second, religious affiliation best indicates a juror's relig-
ious beliefs and, therefore, the potential for juror bias based on
these beliefs." Third, religion is not a self-evident characteristic
like race or sex. Thus, it becomes difficult to make any attempt
at a religion-based Batson challenge without prying into a poten-
tial juror's "inviolate" religious beliefs. 2
This Comment defends the pragmatic line the Minnesota
Supreme Court drew in Davis, because that line facilitates the
efficient administration of fair trials while protecting important
interests of citizens called for jury duty.' 3 Unlike race or sex, re-
ligious affiliation can often serve as a proxy for a juror's beliefs
and likely biases. Religion-based juror strikes, therefore,
threaten neither the anti-discrimination principle of equal protec-
tion nor the integrity of the criminal justice system. In fact, if
courts subjected religion-based peremptory challenges to stan-
dard Batson analysis, the difficulty of defining religious belief
would raise the already substantial costs of determining the va-
lidity of challenges. Furthermore, accurately ascertaining pro-
spective jurors' religious beliefs in voir dire requires intrusive
questioning which can alienate jurors and may infringe upon
their constitutional rights. Religion-based peremptory challenges
avoid these substantial administrative and privacy costs while
allowing litigants to strike potentially biased jurors, thus vindi-
cating the Constitution's guarantee of a trial by an impartial
jury.,
Part I explains the pragmatic value of the peremptory chal-
lenge and how courts accommodate the peremptory challenge un-
der equal protection principles as applied to race, sex, and other
personal characteristics. Part 11 describes the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's refusal to extend Batson to religion in State v
Davis, and other courts' approaches to the religion question be-
fore and after the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Davis. Part
III argues that the Batson regime should not apply to religion.
Id at 771.
Id.
12 Id.
IS Other commentators defend religion-based peremptory challenges primarily on
equal protection grounds. See generally Comment, Religion: The Cognizable Difference in
Peremptory Challenges, 5 Widener J Pub L 131 (1995) (arguing that the equal protection
reasoning of Batson and J.E.B. does not apply to religion).
1 US Const, Amend VI.
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I. THE LAW OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The peremptory challenge came about as, and remains, a
way for a lawyer to protect his client from prospective jurors'
prejudices, "even without being able to assign a reason for... his
dislike."15 The first Congress proposed the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an "impartial jury" and enacted a statute allowing
peremptory challenges in criminal trials.6 Today, Congress
grants the federal peremptory challenge through 28 USC §
1866(c). 7 In most federal jury trials, judges conduct voir dire
questioning and issue for-cause challenges themselves, after
which lawyers may exercise peremptory strikes." The Supreme
Court protects the use of the peremptory challenge, citing its
"very old credentials" 9 and reiterating a commitment not to "un-
dermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the
administration of justice."
" William M Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 347 (Chicago
1979).
" Act of Apr 30, 1790, ch 9, § 30, 1 Stat 119. See also Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474,
481-482 (1989) (discussing the roots of peremptory challenges in early American law).
17 "[No person or class of persons shall be disqualified, excluded, excused, or exempt
from service as jurors: Provided, That any person summoned for jury service may be ...
(3) excluded upon peremptory challenge as provided by law." 28 USC § 1866(c) (1997).
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets the number of peremptory chal-
lenges for capital cases (twenty), felonies (six for the prosecution, ten for the defense) and
misdemeanors (three each). FRCrP 24(b). In federal civil cases, each party is entitled to
three peremptory challenges, and additional challenges at the court's discretion. 28 USC
§ 1870 (1997). States provide defendants with similar numbers of challenges, generally
with an equal number or fewer for the prosecution. Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and
Jerold H. Israel, eds, Modern Criminal Procedure 1428, n 1-2 (West 8th ed 1994).
" In a survey of over 450 federal judges, sixty-seven percent reported conducting all
of voir dire questioning without lawyer participation. Most judges use some variation of
the "strike" method: after questioning and for-cause challenges, lawyers strike jurors
alternately or simultaneously, either in or out of open court. J. Stratton Shartel, Federal
Judges Employ Wide Variety of Jury Procedures, 8 Inside Lit 1, 15-18 (Sept 1994). Trial
judges, who control voir dire in the federal system, generally respect the peremptory
challenge in its current form. Over 85 percent of federal judges believe that peremptory
challenges contribute to fair trials. Christopher E. Smith and Roxanne Ochoa, The Per-
emptory Challenge in the Eyes of the Trial Judge, 79 Judicature 185, 186 (1996). The most
common complaint about peremptory challenges was that they prolonged voir dire and
trials (18.9 percent), followed by concerns about discrimination (15.8 percent). Racial
discrimination and discrimination by social class drew the most attention (12.6 and 11.6
percent, respectively); sex discrimination ranked with age discrimination as a secondary
concern (each 8.4 percent). Id at 187.
19 Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 212, 219 (1965) (holding systematic race-based
peremptory challenges unconstitutional); see also Georgia v McCollum, 505 US 42, 57
(1992).
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 98-99 (1986).
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A. The Function of Peremptory Challenges
By allowing a lawyer to strike prospective jurors without ex-
planation, the peremptory challenge assures the selection of a
qualified jury, especially when a lawyer cannot articulate his
suspicions of bias.2 Furthermore, its simplicity allows jury selec-
tion to proceed efficiently by avoiding wasteful mini-trials while
also protecting the privacy of both struck and empanelled jurors.
First, peremptory challenges contribute to the selection of an
impartial jury. The only major empirical study of the peremptory
challenge found that while striking jurors will achieve a jury bi-
ased in neither side's favor, it will exclude the jurors most biased
toward each side, leaving a relatively impartial panel.' Jurors
inevitably bring their personal prejudices into the courtroom, and
in any given case, the distribution of bias among individual jurors
resembles a bell curve.' Peremptory challenges allow lawyers,
who possess superior knowledge of the facts and therefore can
most accurately predict the likely impact of bias on their case, to
remove the jurors most likely to be most biased.
The peremptory challenge also bolsters confidence in the sys-
tem for parties, those to whom such confidence -matters most.
The mere appearance of impartiality created by the peremptory
challenge process can reassure parties of a trial's integrity.24 Ad-
ditionally, the process of weeding out bias in the jury may im-
press on the remaining jurors their duty to remain impartial.'
Second, peremptory challenges accomplish their ends by effi-
cient means. In Press Enterprise v Superior Court,26 the Supreme
Court observed that prolonged voir dire, "in and of itself, under-
mines public confidence in the courts."7 The Court noted that
21 See J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127, 148 (O'Connor concurring) ("[A] trial lawyer's
judgments about a juror's sympathies are sometimes based on experienced hunches and
educated guesses ... That a trial lawyer's instinctive assessment of a juror's predisposi-
tion cannot meet the high standards of a challenge for cause does not mean that the law-
yer's instinct is erroneous.").
' Hans Zeisel and Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury
and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 Stan L Rev 491, 525, 528
(1978) ("The Effect of Peremptory Challenges") (explaining that extremes in juror bias can
be eliminated if courts provide a sufficient number of challenges).
Id at 527.
J.E.B., 511 US at 161 n 3 (Scalia dissenting) ("If the system of peremptory strikes
affects the actual impartiality of the jury not a bit, but gives litigants a greater belief in
that impartiality, it serves a most important function. In point of fact, that may well be
its greater value.") (citation omitted).
Zeisel and Diamond, 30 Stan L Rev at 512 (cited in note 22).
' 464 US 501 (1984) (holding constitutional guarantee of public trial applies to voir
dire proceedings).
Id at510 n9.
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voir dire in California can last as long as six months, and in the
capital murder case at issue it required six weeks of court timeY
Restraints on peremptory challenges create an incentive to con-
duct meticulous voir dire because lawyers need more information
to justify any challenge they make, and judges need more infor-
mation to determine the legitimacy of lawyers' justifications. As
judges increasingly scrutinize peremptory challenges, lawyers
may seek for-cause challenges more often, requiring even deeper
inquiry into each juror's potential biases. Finally, administering
restraints on peremptory challenges through ancillary mini-trials
consumes courtroom resources that would be better expended in
trying the case.
Third, peremptory challenges protect prospective jurors,
whether struck or empanelled. Not only do jurors benefit by
shorter voir dire, but they also avoid questions that may offend
them or intrude upon their privacy. One commentator suggests
that intrusive questions aggravate jurors, pointing out that two-
thirds of jurors surveyed found voir dire too personal and offen-
sive. Prospective jurors ought not be demeaned and idled by
unnecessarily prolonged voir dire, particularly before they have
even assumed their duties.
B. Equal Protection Limitations on Peremptory Challenges: The
Batson Rule
Batson v Kentucky'0 held that race-based peremptory chal-
lenges violate the Equal Protection Clause, and that the defen-
dant may prove the violation based solely on juror selection in his
case.3 The current Batson rule, as modified by subsequent cases,
' Id. One cause of the delay may be California's constitutional restrictions on the
exercise of peremptory challenges.
Mark Curriden, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge, 80 ABA J 62, 65 (Jan
1994) (citing a 1992 survey of more than 100 jurors by the Atlanta Constitution).
" 476 US 79 (1986).
1 Id at 95. Batson stands in a long line of cases specifically redressing race-based
exclusion from juries. See generally id at 103-05 (Marshall concurring) (citing historical
and statistical evidence of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges). As early as
1879, in Strauder v West Virginia, the Supreme Court drew on the recently ratified Four-
teenth Amendment to prohibit statutory exclusion of African Americans from the venire.
100 US 303, 305, 310 (1879). Norris v Alabama prohibited the total exclusion of black
jurors on the pretext that they were biased or unqualified. 294 US 587, 599 (1935).
Swain v Alabama held that a state's "purposeful or deliberate" discrimination against
black prospective jurors in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause. 380 US
202, 203-04 (1965). Swain placed a "crippling burden of proof" on parties seeking to prove
discrimination by requiring proof of discriminatory strikes over several cases, and Batson
relaxed this burden. Batson, 476 US at 92.
445441]
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requires a three-step inquiry. First, the party opposing the per-
emptory challenge must make a prima facie showing that the
struck juror was excluded from the jury because of his race.'
Under Powers v Ohio,.4 the struck juror and the defendant need
not be of the same race, because the defendant has third-party
standing to raise the juror's discrimination claim.35 Still, the op-
posing party must prove that the juror is "a member of a racial
group capable of being singled out for differential treatment."36
Second, the prosecution may provide a race-neutral reason for the
challenge. The reason need not rise to the justification of a
challenge for cause, but cannot be a mere denial of discriminatory
purpose.' According to Purkett v Elem,39 the prosecution's expla-
nation need not be persuasive, nor even plausible, but need only
have a "facial validity."40 Third, the trial court must decide
whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.4'
Throughout the inquiry, "the ultimate burden of persuasion re-
garding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the
opponent of the strike.m
Batson and its progeny balance the benefits and costs of
categorically prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges. The
benefits of preventing discrimination and changing attitudes
about race in jury selection are great. Limiting these challenges
prevents the use of race-based stereotypes and makes juries more
racially representative." The costs of discovering and invalidat-
" 476 US at 96-98. The Court reaffirmed the three-step process in Hernandez v New
York, which also sustained the discretionary power of trial judges to rule on discrimina-
tory purpose in Batson challenges as a matter of fact, reversible only for clear error. 500
US 352, 358-59, 364-65 (1991).
476 US at 96.
499 US 400 (1991).
Id.
476 US at 94.
Id at 97.
Id.
514 US 765 (1995).
Id at 768, quoting Hernandez 500 US at 360. Since Purkett, courts have accepted
apparently pretextual excuses for discriminatory strikes. Purkett itself, for example, up-
held a peremptory challenge against a black male because the prosecutor did not like the
juror's long, unkempt hair, mustache and beard. Purkett, 514 US at 769. One commenta-
tor found that of thirty-eight appellate cases citing Purkett, each involving a possibly pre-
textual challenge, only one reversed the trial court's determination that the challenge was
proper. Note, The Future Viability ofBatson v Kentucky and the Practical Implications of
Purkett v Elem, 16 Rev Litig 137, 171 (1997).
Batson, 476 US at 98.
42 Purkett, 514 US at 768.
' Batson may work best indirectly as an expression of anti-racist attitudes in the
courtroom rather than a cure-all remedying every improper strike. See, for example,
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir dire, Peremptory Challenges,
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ing race-based challenges are relatively low. In the first step the
prerequisite for a defendant's third-party standing - the juror's
membership in "a racial group capable of being singled out for
differential treatment' - is almost always self-evident. So, too,
is the facial validity of the striking party's racially neutral reason
in the second step. Furthermore, because race is never a legiti-
mate proxy for a juror's ability to serve effectively, the cost of
seating improperly biased jurors by denying a challenge is mini-
mal. The effective application of equal protection doctrine to per-
emptory challenges requires just this approach.
C. J.E.B.: The Extension of Batson to Sex
J.E.B. v Alabama45 marked a shift in the line of cases ex-
plaining Batson. For the first time, J.E.B. restricted the use of
peremptory challenges justified on grounds other than race. The
Court held that peremptory challenges based on a prospective
juror's sex violated the equal protection clause.46 Applying the
"heightened scrutiny" standard applicable to sex classifications,47
the Supreme Court found no "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" that the sex-based peremptory challenge "substantially fur-
thers the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and im-
partial trial."4 According to the Court, these challenges violate
equal protection because they "ratify and perpetuate invidious,
archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of
men and women."49 Lawyers selecting a jury may not presume,
solely based on a prospective juror's sex, that the juror is too bi-
ased for jury service.50
By extending Batson beyond race, the Court left open the
possibility of further extending scrutiny of peremptory challenges
to other suspect classifications.5 Yet while J.E.B. concentrated
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 172 (1989) ("Because most prosecu-
tors will probably comply with the Supreme Courts decision in good faith, Batson may
work a significant change in American trial practice. I suspect in fact that it has.").
" Batson, 476 US at 94.
4' 511 US 127 (1994).
SId at 130-31.
" The court reopened the question whether strict scrutiny might apply to sex as well
as race in United States v Virginia, 116 S Ct 2264, 2274-75 (1996) (holding that an all-
male public military college violates equal protection under heightened scrutiny).
J.E.B., 511 US at 136-37.
Id at 131.
Id at 141.
" In his dissent in Batson, Chief Justice Burger predicted that the application of
conventional equal protection principles might prohibit peremptory challenges "on the
basis of not only race, but also sex, age, religious or political affiliation, mental capacity,
447441]
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on the evils of sex-based stereotypes, the Court also expressly
weighed both the administrability of its new rule and the utility
of strikes based on other group characteristics. First, in con-
ducting its analysis, the Court cited the experience of jurisdic-
tions that had previously prohibited sex-based strikes, arguing
that trial courts are capable of complying with the rule.2 Second,
the Court noted that other group characteristics, like occupation,
that do not reinforce such stereotypes remain a legitimate basis
for peremptory challenges.53  Concurring Justice O'Connor
warned that "[i]n further constitutionalizing jury selection proce-
dures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury se-
lection - once a sideshow - will become part of the main
event.' In short, extending the benefit of Batson's protections
has costs. Consequently, the balance of interests that resulted in
race and sex limitations on peremptory strikes might tilt against
further restrictions protecting other constitutionally recognized
groups.
D. Batson Beyond Race and Sex
In Hernandez v New York," the Supreme Court analyzed
peremptory strikes of Spanish-speaking Latino jurors under Bat-
son. 6 Though ethnicity and race are different, some courts have
often extended Batson protections to ethnic groups." Because
ethnicity is no more legitimately related to bias than race, it is a
good candidate for Batson protection. However, courts may have
difficulty identifying ethnicity; the Court's analysis of discrimina-
tion against jurors in Hernandez stumbled on the fact that only
three struck jurors could "with confidence be identified as Lati-
nos."58 Indeed, the Court declined to resolve the "difficult ques-
tion of the breadth with which the concept of race should be de-
fined" for Batson analysis.59 If the trial judge cannot tell the race
or ethnicity of a particular member of the venire after voir dire,
the costs of determining the validity of a peremptory strike in-
number of children, living arrangements, and employment in a particular industry, or
profession." 476 US 79, 124 (1986) (Burger dissenting) (citations omitted).
J.E.B., 511 US at 144.
Id at 142 n 14.
Id at 147 (O'Connor concurring).
500 US 352 (1991).
Id at 355.
See, for example, United States v Biaggi, 853 F2d 89, 96 (2d Cir 1988) (Italian
Americans protected under Batson).
Hernandez, 500 US at 370.
Id at 371.
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crease substantially. When such a determination requires a
lengthy and intrusive reexamination of the struck juror, a judge's
best option may be simply to deny the Batson challenge.
Language can serve as a surrogate for race, and when it
does, Batson should apply." However, a juror's fluency in a for-
eign language can also undermine his compliance with courtroom
procedures, specifically his adherence to the official record
translation of testimony in that language. Hernandez reveals the
Court wrestling with legitimate and illegitimate reasons for
striking a prospective juror on language grounds. The prosecutor
had struck two Latino jurors because he doubted that they would
properly rely on the official court interpreter.6' A plurality of four
Justices held that the trial court did not err in upholding the
strikes, 2 but in dicta suggested that a "policy of striking all who
speak a given language, without regard to the particular circum-
stances of the trial," may be considered a pretext for racial dis-
crimination." Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, con-
curred with the judgment but disagreed with the plurality's sug-
gestion that intentional language-based discrimination in jury
selection should be considered as a surrogate for prohibited racial
discrimination.' The Court's reluctance to define a rule for lan-
guage-based strikes stems from the relevance of language ability
to a juror's qualifications. Language can change a juror's percep-
tion of a trial, and it is extremely difficult to determine in voir
dire if that perception will reach the level of bias. In these situa-
tions, the peremptory challenge is particularly useful.
Another example is even more telling. Some parties have
challenged strikes based on sexual orientation, apparently read-
ing J.E.B.'s prohibition against discrimination "on the basis of
gender" broadly.65 Although sexual orientation is an undesirable
proxy for bias, the personal costs to prospective jurors of inquir-
ing into their intimate lives in the courtroom may be too great to
justify Batson protection. Such inquiries not only demand judi-
cial scrutiny of jurors' sexual habits, but also threaten to "out"
gay or lesbian jurors in voir dire or a Batson hearing. At least
one court has acknowledged these costs and refused to extend
' Id.
Id at 357 n 1.
Hernandez, 500 US at 352.
SId at 371-72.
Id at 375.
511 US at 130. See also, United States v Gayden, 1993 US App LEXIS 30555 (7th
Cir) (deciding not to rule on Batson challenge because juror who admitted that she was a
lesbian and stated that she may be biased was properly struck for cause).
441] 449
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Batson to sexual orientation.66
Batson challenges can effectively protect against invidious
discrimination when identity is self-evident and unrelated to a
legitimate source of bias. Race and sex are the most obvious ex-
amples, but other self-evident attributes of prospective jurors
may also merit Batson protection. As federal courts wrestle with
the applicability of Batson to cases of ethnicity, language and
sexual orientation, they reveal the importance of balancing equal
protection against other important interests. In so doing, they
suggest useful approaches to religion. For example, the Hernan-
dez Court's difficulty in determining whether or not struck jurors
were actually Latinos would be compounded in any attempt to
establish a struck juror's religion, because religion is often less
apparent than ethnicity. Similarly, the Court avoided ruling on
the applicability of Batson to Spanish-speaking jurors because
language skills can often affect a juror's suitability in the same
way religion can affect a juror's impartiality. Finally, the hesi-
tancy of courts to apply Batson to personal attributes such as
sexual orientation parallels a similar privacy concern in the case
of religion.
II. THE RELIGION DIFFERENCE: DAVIS DRAWS THE LINE
Religious classifications are subject to "strict scrutiny" under
the Constitution. 7 Many commentators draw the conclusion that
religion, because it is subject to the same heightened level of
scrutiny as race and sex, ought to receive the same treatment
under Batson in the context of peremptory challenges.' How-
ever, such formalism is misplaced where, as in the context of re-
ligious peremptory challenges, constitutional considerations may
justify either extension or restriction of scrutiny. A pragmatic
approach expands the circle of relevant interests beyond equal
' Johnson v Campbell, 92 F3d 951, 953 (9th Cir 1996) (finding that district court did
not err when it refused to inquire into a struck juror's sexual orientation, and denied a
Batson hearing on the strike).
7 See Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 246 (1982) (noting that the Court must use
strict scrutiny in evaluating a law under the Establishment Clause and invalidating
charity registration law selectively exempting some, but not all, religious organizations).
See, for example, Note, Extending Batson v Kentucky to Religion-Based Peremp-
tory Challenges, 4 S Cal Interdisc L J 99, 102 (1995) (arguing "religion-based peremptory
challenges legitimize evils similar to those inherent in racially discriminatory jury selec-
tion"); Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v Kentucky and J.E.B. v
Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 Mich L Rev 191, 193
(1995) (asserting that the strict scrutiny analysis of religion-based peremptory challenges
under the First Amendment is the same as strict scrutiny of race- and sex-based peremp-
tory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause).
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protection of prospective jurors. This approach includes the ju-
rors' other interests alongside administrative interests as well as
the interests of the parties.
A. State v Davis
In State v Davis, 9 a prosecutor challenged a Jehovah's Wit-
ness because, she explained, "[Iln my experience Jahovah Wit-
ness [sic] are reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow hu-
man beings in this Court House."" The trial judge ruled that the
peremptory challenge could stand, the jury convicted Davis, and
the court of appeals affirmed the conviction.71 The Minnesota
Supreme Court analyzed Davis under Powers v Ohio,72 a case in
which the struck juror was of a different race than the
defendant.73 The defendant in Davis, like the defendant in Pow-
ers, could not claim that the Jehovah's Witness naturally sympa-
thized with him because of shared identity; instead, he argued
that the strike violated the juror's equal protection rights.74
The Davis court found that, although "[a] juror's religious
beliefs are inviolate ... they are the basis for a person's moral
values," 5 and therefore a peremptory strike based on religion
does not manifest a "pernicious religious bias.' 6 In other words,
concerns about reinforcing impermissible stereotypes do not
weigh as heavily with religion as with race, because a juror's re-
ligion may determine his views in a way that the law, the other
jurors, and the juror himself can recognize as legitimate. This
legitimacy mitigates cynicism among jurors, while striking jurors
on the basis that religion correlates to moral values promotes im-
partiality.
On the other hand, extending Batson to religion would im-
pose substantial administrative and privacy costs. First, oppos-
ing counsel would demand religion-neutral grounds for every
strike, because lawyers may have no other way of detecting im-
permissible strikes when religion is difficult to ascertain.77 Such
tactics would "unduly complicate voir dire.' Second, Powers
504 NW2d 767 (Minn 1993).
' Id at 768.
Id at 767-68.
499 US 400 (1991).
Id at 406.
504 NW2d at 769.
Id at 771.
78 Id.
Id.
" 504 NW2d at 771.
441]
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only permits the defendant to challenge the peremptory strikes
when the struck juror has standing as a member of a class subject
to discrimination,79 and in this instance, "inquiry on voir dire into
a juror's religious affiliation and beliefs is irrelevant and prejudi-
cial."8
Summarizing its pragmatic rationale, the Davis court wrote:
"If the life of the law were logic rather than experience, Batson
might well be extended to include religious bias and, for that
matter, an endless number of other biases.""1 The logic of equal
protection does not conclusively describe the balance of constitu-
tional interests involved in religion-based peremptory challenges.
The balancing of these interests in the courtroom, according to
Davis, counsels against an extension of Batson.
B. Certiorari Denial
In a memorandum concurrence to the denial of certiorari in
Davis v Minnesota,"2 Justice Ginsburg cited approvingly to what
she considered two essential observations of the Minnesota court.
First, religious affiliation "is not as self-evident as race or gen-
der,s 3 and second, inquiry into a prospective juror's religious be-
liefs "is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions is
improper.""4 Ginsburg's memorandum was short, containing only
these two observations. She offered no equal protection analysis,
but instead addressed practical aspects related to the administra-
tion of challenges and the potential consequences of an extension
of Batson to religion." Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing that under J.E.B.
there was "no principled reason" for declining to extend Batson to
all classifications subject to heightened scrutiny, such as
religion.86
" Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 415 (1991).
Davis, 504 NW2d at 772.
" Id at 769. The court is alluding to Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Common Law, in Richard A. Posner, ed, The Essential Holmes 237 (Chicago
1992) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
511 US 1115 (1994).
Id (Ginsburg concurring), citing Davis, 504 NW2d at 771.
511 US at 1116 (Ginsburg concurring), citing Davis, 504 NW2d at 772.
511 US at 1115-16 (Ginsburg concurring).
Id at 1117 (Thomas dissenting). Originally opponents of any extension of Batson
beyond race, this opinion marks a concession by Justices Thomas and Scalia to stare deci-
sis. Justice Scalia's dissent from J.E.B., joined by Justice Thomas, lamented the damage
the Batson doctrine inflicts on the peremptory challenge system, "which loses its whole
character when... 'reasons' for strikes must be given." J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127,
161-62 (1994) (Scalia dissenting). In the same dissent, Justice Scalia foreshadowed his
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Justice Ginsburg's argument reflects a broader, more prag-
matic concern for jurors' interests- than the usual, abstract argu-
ments that "stereotypes have wreaked injustice in so many other
spheres of our country's public life," 7 or that a juror's primary
interest is "to participate in the administration of justice. In
fact, prospective jurors may value their privacy more than they
value their civic responsibilities.89 Many prospective jurors do not
want to serve jury duty at all." While it remains unclear
whether the Court supports Davis, Justice Ginsburg's comments
suggest concern about the costs of extending Batson to religion.
C. Courts in Conflict
No consensus exists on extending Batson to religion, adding
considerable uncertainty to the already difficult enterprise of
scrutinizing peremptory challenges. Both before and after Bat-
son, several states have imposed broad restrictions on peremp-
tory challenges based on a juror's membership in certain cogniza-
ble groups. California led this movement in 1978 with People v
Wheeler,9 which held that the state constitution prohibited per-
emptory strikes based on "group bias," or membership in "an
identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic or
similar grounds."92 Several other states followed suit, usually
basing their decisions on broader equal protection provisions in
state constitutions, some explicitly protecting religion as a cogni-
zable class. 3 However, these cases have only persuasive value for
federal courts and few of these provisions have been tested by
claim in Davis that religion must also fall within the Batson regime after J.E.B.. Id at
161-62.
J.E.B., 511 US at 140.
Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 406 (1991).
In one survey of 562 judges, 73 percent of them reported veniremen lying in voir
dire in at least one case they had tried during the last three years. Nancy J. King, Juror
Delinquency in Criminal Trials inAmerica, 1796-1996, 94 Mich L Rev 2673, 2732 (1996).
According to the judges who elaborated on reasons they thought veniremembers
had lied, the most common reason for dishonesty was to avoid jury service. Id at 2736.
583 P2d 748 (Cal 1978).
Id at 761.
See, for example, Commonwealth v Soares, 387 NE2d 499, 516 (Mass 1979) (citing
protection of "creed" in state constitution); State v Gilmore, 511 A2d 1150, 1158 (NJ 1986)
(including "religious principles" in prohibited group biases); Fields v People, 732 P2d 1145,
1153 n 15 (Colo 1987) (extending Batson to religion, among other categories); State v Lev-
inson, 795 P2d 845, 849 (Hawaii 1990) (citing state constitution and statute prohibiting
jury exclusion on basis of religion); State v Eason, 445 SE2d 917, 922-23 (NC 1994), cert
denied, 115 SCt 764 (1995) (prohibiting peremptory challenges based on religion, unless
based on specific tenet likely to bias juror); People v Langston, 641 NYS2d 513, 514 (NY
Sup Ct 1996) (citing protection of "creed or religion" in state constitution).
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cases involving religion-based challenges.
Like Minnesota, Texas declined to extend Batson protection
to religion in a case actually involving a religion-based
challenge.' In Cazarez v State,95 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that Batson did not apply to religion-based peremp-
tory challenges.' In Casarez, the State struck two black prospec-
tive jurors and then answered a Batson challenge to the strikes
by explaining that Pentecostal jurors have difficulty assessing
punishment." According to the decision, religion-based peremp-
tory challenges did not "denigrat[e] the dignity of any individual
veniremembers," unlike challenges based on race or sex.' The
court concluded that J.E.B. "does not imply the elimination of all
peremptory challenges,"9 and does not extend Batson to all
heightened scrutiny classifications.'"
The court argued that members of a religion share beliefs,
and that discrimination based on a juror's religion only results
from these shared beliefs. 1 Religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges, the court reasoned, solely concern the juror's personal be-
liefs, which "has always been considered appropriate in the jury
selection context."0 2 Because members of the same religion
"share the same faith by definition, it is not unjust to attribute
beliefs characteristic of the faith to all of them."03 Thus, Casarez
focused primarily on the legitimacy of religious stereotyping in
the jury selection process, rather than on administrative prob-
lems.
Lower federal courts do not agree on whether Batson should
extend to religion. Before the denial of certiorari in Davis, the
Fifth Circuit, in United States v Greer,"°4 upheld the District
Court's refusal to allow the defendant to exclude minority jurors,
including Jews, from sitting on a jury at trial of white suprema-
cists accused of violating the civil rights of black, Hispanic and
Virginia has suggested a similar conclusion. See James v Commonwealth, 442
SE2d 396, 398 (Va 1994) (permitting religion-based explanations to rebut prima facie case
of racial discrimination injury selection).
913 SW2d 468 (Tex Crim App 1995).
Id at 496.
Id at 496-97 (Mansfield concurring).
Id at 495.
913 SW2d at 496, citing J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127, 143 (1994).
913 SW2d at 496
101 Id at 495.
102 Id.
. Id at 496.
"" 939 F2d 1076 (5th Cir 1991) affd en banc, 968 F2d 433, 434 (5th Cir 1992).
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Jewish citizens."5 The panel found that Batson applies to Jewish
jurors regardless of whether they are a "race" or a religion, but
cited no authority to support applying Batson to religion."° How-
ever, in response to the defendants' request to determine which
jurors were Jewish, the Greer panel suggested that "having the
judge determine which jurors are Jewish requires questions dis-
turbingly reminiscent of those asked by the very people the
[white supremacist defendants] sought to celebrate." 7 Paradoxi-
cally, these are exactly the questions required to determine the
validity of a religious peremptory strike.' However, the Fifth
Circuit reheard Greer en banc, affirming the convictions but di-
viding equally over whether the trial court erred in refusing to
inquire into the religious affiliation of the jurors."°9
D. United States v Somerstein
More recently, in United States v Somerstein,"0 a District
Court held that Batson protects Jews as a religious group and
alternatively as a racial group."' Furthermore, in applying its
rule, Somerstein demonstrated in detail the administrative prob-
lems that Casarez bypassed. The defendants in Somerstein, offi-
cers and employees of a kosher caterer, were charged with con-
spiring to defraud the restaurant union."' The prosecution
struck six "ostensibly" Jewish prospective jurors."
In ruling on the strikes, the court specifically adopted the
equal protection reasoning of Justice Thomas's dissent in Davis v
Minnesota." But the Somerstein couft also noted Justice Gins-
burg's observation that religion is not as self-evident as race or
gender, and that this fact "will inevitably lead to factual disputes
as to whether the particular juror is of the Jewish faith.""5 In-
deed, the case examines six challeges to peremptory strikes, pro-
viding a useful example of Batson's application to religion.
In refining the Batson challenge for religion the court first
' Id at 1084.
' Id at 1086. See also Shaare Tefila Congregation v Cobb, 481 US 615, 617 (1987)
(holding that Jews may be classified as a protected group under 42 USC § 1982).
939 F2d at 1085.
See Part IV B.
' 968 F2d 433, 438 (5th Cir 1992).
959 F Supp 592 (E D NY 1997).
Id at 595.
112 Id at 594.
11 Id.
.. 959 F Supp at 595.
15 Id.
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found that because "the religious element is intertwined in the
criminal charges,"116 religion was factually relevant to the case."7
The court next tried to determine whether each struck juror was
Jewish, allowing the defendant to assert third party standing on
their behalf."'
Of the six jurors, the court found none had been struck im-
properly."' Only one of the struck jurors indicated that she was
Jewish by answering a questionnaire as "Jewish American," and
the prosecutor struck her for the facially valid reason that she
was uncomfortable crossing picket lines.2 As for the other pro-
spective jurors, one gave "insufficient evidence" of being Jewish.'21
Another had what the defendants termed a "quintessential Jew-
ish name" and was assumed to be Jewish but was struck for a
"facially valid reason."1" The defendants considered another pro-
spective juror Jewish because he attended a club catered by a
kosher caterer, but the court considered the fact that he claimed
to attend union meetings "only if they served breakfast" sufficient
reason for a peremptory challenge. 2 ' The court found that the
defendants failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination
with regard to the fifth prospective juror,"24 and that the sixth
prospective juror likely was not of the Jewish faith, and could not
be struck solely because of her relationship to a Jewish person."
Such determinations, pitting stereotype against gross stereo-
type in motions, hearings and finally in a legal opinion, colorfully
illustrate the problem of extending equal protection to jurors
whose religious identity is known only to themselves. Somer-
stein's review of the challenges posed additional difficulties be-
cause of the absence of the struck jurors. The record provides the
only basis for determining each juror's religion. The court could
have answered the first question of standing by asking during
voir dire whether the prospective jurors were Jewish. But such
questions raise uncomfortable issues. Is it appropriate for judges
to make a practice of probing the religious beliefs of each member
... Id at 596.
117 Id.
"' See also Ohio v Powers, 499 US 400, 415 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant
has standing to raise third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prose-
cution because oftheir race).
'9 959 F Supp at 596-97.
Id at 597.
121 Id at 596.
Id at 596-97.
959 F Supp at 597.
124 Id.
12 Id.
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of the venire?'26 Once the court answers the threshold question of
a juror's religion, however, more problems arise. When, if ever,
does a juror's religion threaten his impartiality? For example, in
the trial of a Roman Catholic priest for blocking access to an
abortion clinic, should Catholic jurors be protected against chal-
lenges?12 These questions highlight the potential pitfalls of de-
nying peremptory challenges when the basis for striking a juror,
such as religion, may reasonably relate to the facts of the par-
ticular case.
III. ENTRENCHING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE,
PRAGMATICALLY
Religion is different from sex and race. Race and sex are
practically immutable characteristics and they are irrelevant to a
juror's ability to find facts. Religion represents an individual's
moral outlook and does not easily fit into categories reflecting
relevant biases. Given these differences, the practical question is
how to treat religion-based peremptory challenges.
Recall the peremptory challenge's functions.12 First and
foremost, it helps to create impartial juries, and to bolster parties'
confidence in that impartiality. Second, their simplicity enables
courts and lawyers efficiently to empanel a jury without extensive
voir dire. Third, jurors need not endure the prolonged and intru-
sive voir dire required if all challenges were for-cause. Because
the combined interests of the parties, the jury and the efficiency
of the justice system overcome equal protection objections, courts
should refuse to extend Batson to religion.
A. An Impartial Jury: Religion as a Proxy for Bias
A juror's particular religious beliefs can directly affect his
ability to deliberate impartially. As the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized, religion shapes a juror's views on exactly the
kinds of issues that arise in many trials, such as "the use of in-
toxicating liquor, cohabitation, necessity of medical treatment,
civil disobedience, and the like.""2 Given the reasonable correla-
'= See Part IV C.
' See Corn v Carleton, 629 NE2d 321 (1994) (invalidating challenges based on jurors'
Irish surnames).
See Part I A.
'2 State v Davis, 504 NW2d 767, 771 (Minn 1993). Additionally, Jeffrey Rosen sug-
gests from anecdotal evidence that jurors commonly cite religious belief as an explanation
for nullifying verdicts. Jeffrey Rosen, After 'One Angry Woman,' 1998 U Chi Legal F 179.
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tion of these societal views to jurors' religious beliefs, religion-
based peremptory strikes cannot be simply attributed to "a perni-
cious religious bias."'
Because religion is not a perfect proxy for bias, courts might
distinguish between religious beliefs and religious affiliation in
determining the validity of suspicious peremptory strikes.' 3'
However, the law should refuse to recognize such a distinction
because, aside from the constitutional difficulties of deciding
which beliefs correlate to a certain religious affiliation, the courts
would have to account for the infinite variation ofjurors' religious
experiences. In response to this problem, another commentator
advocates extending Batson to religion precisely because it is im-
possible to define religion.'32 "Once we acknowledge the sweep of
religious experience, the assumption that religious affiliation can
tell us anything of consequence to jury selection is dubious at
best." '3 Indeed, a lawyer's religion-based peremptory challenge
probably rests on little more than the prospective juror's appar-
ent religious affiliation, because it is practically impossible to de-
termine a juror's specific religious beliefs during voir dire. How-
ever, neither the lawyer nor the judge can or should have to "ac-
knowledge the sweep of religious experience"" in weeding out
potentially biased jurors. They should select as impartial a jury
as is practically possible, and get on with the trial; such abstrac-
tions unduly complicate this task.
Even if a lawyer or judge asked a prospective juror about his
religious beliefs, "[p]otential jurors may hide their prejudices
from the examiner, either consciously or unconsciously. In the
end, it is difficult to define and describe the borderline between
prejudice and value differences with any precision.""' The law
does not require bases for peremptory challenges for precisely
this reason.
" 504 NW2d at 771.
... See Comment, The Equal Protection Clause, The Free Exercise Clause and Relig-
ion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 63 U Chi L Rev 1639, 1641 (1996) ("[Ajlthough courts
should bar challenges based solely on a venireman's religious affiliation, they should con-
tinue to permit challenges based on his actual beliefs, even when those beliefs spring from
the venireman's religion.").
" Lori Krafte-Jacobs, What Is -Religion" in Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges?,
65 U Cin L Rev 1291, 1320 (1991).
.. Id at 1322.
13 Id.
" Zeisel and Diamond, 30 Stan L Rev at 531 (cited in note 22) (explaining that preju-
dice becomes difficult to define in all but the most extreme cases).
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B. The Efficient Administration of Justice
Any restriction on peremptory challenges adds to court ad-
ministrative costs. Courts must police, adjudicate and punish
illegal juror strikes, all at a direct cost to the parties involved and
the justice system as a whole. When the constitutional injury
rests on a juror's race or sex, proof turns on the relatively clear
question of race or sex neutrality. If the constitutional injury
rests on a juror's religion, the court must first establish the ju-
ror's religion, and then determine whether or not the striking
party offered a religion neutral reason. Both of these questions
significantly complicate the standard Batson injury.
Furthermore, without religion-based peremptory strikes, the
judge would have to bear the burden of inquiring into a juror's
particular beliefs in voir dire, so he could exercise for-cause chal-
lenges properly. And every challenge of a potentially biased juror
that the law prohibits or discourages by regulating religion-based
strikes would put pressure on the lawyer to prove actual bias.
Inevitably, this dynamic would lead to longer voir dire, as lawyer
and judge "probe more deeply. into the individually-held beliefs
and practices of prospective jurors in order to ascertain how re-
ligious a prospective juror is.""' Prohibiting religious-based per-
emptory strikes also provides lawyers with an easily abused stra-
tegic weapon. If one side makes a peremptory challenge, the
other side might claim the challenge is religion-based, and the
battle is joined to determine the strength of the juror's innermost
convictions.' 37 Unlike race and sex, religion is hard for a judge to
"eyeball" in order to assess the merits of the claim. Unable to
make a quick discretionary judgment in many cases, the judge
would be forced to convene a mini-trial on the juror's religion and
the strike's religion-neutrality, with all its associated costs and
delays.
C. Juror Privacy and Perception
A juror's perception of the trial process is an important con-
sideration in evaluating the legality of peremptory challenges. In
Batson and J.E.B., the Supreme Court expressed concern that
discriminatory challenges "undermine public confidence in the
Comment, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1669 (cited in note 131).
' See State v Davis, 504 NW2d 767, 771 (Minn 1993) ("religious affiliation (or lack
thereof) is not as self-evident as race or gender. Consequently, for every peremptory
strike, opposing counsel could demand a religion-neutral explanation.m").
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fairness of our system of justice,"3 ' and "create the impression
that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full par-
ticipation... or that the 'deck has been stacked' in favor of one
side.'3 9
One commentator argues that all peremptory challenges in-
dicate to jurors "that the foundation of this system is not evi-
dence, but rather rumor, innuendo, and prejudice."4 ° However,
these criticisms underestimate jurors and overstate the message
that religion-based peremptory challenges send to them. First, it
assumes that jurors cannot understand that challenges minimize
jury prejudice by truncating the extremes of bias in the jury pool.
But jurors understand that trust is largely an intuition, and each
side wants a jury it can trust. In fact, courts expect jurors to em-
ploy precisely this intuition to determine the credibility of wit-
nesses. Second, the argument overstates the meaning jurors re-
ceive from peremptory challenges. If a prospective juror wit-
nesses or even experiences a peremptory challenge apparently
based religion, he may not think the strike reflects a systemic
consensus condoning religious stereotypes.'' He simply may see
a lawyer striking a juror because the lawyer, on a hunch, does not
trust that particular juror to serve impartially.
Despite the Court's focus on the "discrimination and dis-
honor" engendered by peremptory challenges based on stereo-
types," jurors may be more concerned with intrusive, prolonged
voir dire than with the rapid reprieve from jury duty that a per-
emptory strike provides.'
More is at stake for jurors than their equal protection rights.
Any rule requiring court intrusion into prospective jurors' relig-
ious beliefs could further erode the minimal privacy provided by
the court system.' Explicitly applying Batson to religion would
increase the number of peremptory strikes subject to Batson
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 87 (1986). ,
J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127, 140 (1994), quoting Ohio v Powers,. 499 US 400,
413 (1991).
" Hoffman, 64 U Chi L Rev at 861 (cited in note 7).
141 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
Mich L Rev 338, 404 n 217 (1997) ("Where cases or statutes are not well suited to publicize
a consensus... there is little weight to criticisms or defenses of the law based on what it
may mean to people.").
2 Id at 142 n 15.
Curriden, 80 ABA J at 65 (cited in note 29); King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2732, 2736
(cited in note 89).
'4 See generally David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitu-
tional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 Temple L Rev 1 (1997) (discussing invasion of
the juror's right to privacy).
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challenges. Each challenge to a religion-based peremptory strike
would require probing questions to establish third-party standing
on the juror's behalf. If the juror's religion could threaten his im-
partiality, then the court must inquire whether the juror's par-
ticular beliefs might sustain a challenge for cause. However,
courts may not ask these questions unfettered. Although trial
judges exercise broad discretion over voir dire, one court has held
that questions about religious beliefs are relevant only if perti-
nent to religious issues involved in the case, if a religious organi-
zation is a party, or if the information is a necessary predicate for
a for-cause challenge.'45 In the context of press access, the Su-
preme Court has asserted that prospective jurors enjoy a limited
right of privacy when voir dire may involve personal or embar-
rassing questions. 4 ' If the constitutionality of a jury's composi-
tion were to turn on the religion of the jurors, it would only mag-
nify these legitimate privacy concerns.
CONCLUSION
Batson has revolutionized courtroom attitudes about race,
but courts should not bring its imperfect administrative appara-
tus to bear on the subtler attributes of jurors' consciences. The
evaluation of peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause involves a balancing act. Batson and J.E.B. strike a
pragmatic balance, where a reduction of challenges based on race
or sex might justify the restrictions on a lawyer's ability to re-
move biased jurors. While J.E.B. was pending, Professor
Randolph Stone argued that "No one likes discrimination, but
this case comes down to whose rights should be given the most
protection in court."47 Evaluating religion-based peremptory
challenges under Batson is not as simple as giving jurors the en-
tire panoply of equal protection rights they enjoy elsewhere in
life. Like the peremptory challenge itself, the assessment of its
proper role should be practical. The life of the law is indeed expe-
rience and, drawing on that experience, a pragmatic approach
can help to resolve the novel equal protection issues that are
' Coleman v United States, 379 A2d 951, 954 (DC 1977).
l46 Press Enterprise v Superior Court of California, 464 US 501, 512 (1984). The Court
has also held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids a court to submit the question of the
truth of religious beliefs to a criminal jury. United States v Ballard, 322 US 78, 88 (1944).
"Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their re-
ligious doctrines or beliefs." Id at 86.
.. Curriden, 80 ABA J at 64 (cited in note 29) (quoting Randolph Stone).
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founded in courtroom reality at the heart of the legal system -
the jury box.
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